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CHAPTER 3 
The Financialisation of Poverty 
 
Given this book’s claim that microfinance financialises poverty, a deeper discussion of 
“poverty” is still necessary. The conception of poverty employed here draws on Simmel’s The 
Poor, which analysed the relationship between poor people and society at large to argue that, 
in any given society, who is “poor” and who isn’t depends less on specific deprivation than on 
whether someone is (or should be) the subject of dedicated institutions that help and control 
them. Simmel observed how societies organised different forms of poor assistance which 
could be premised either on poor people holding intrinsic rights to receive assistance, or on 
the rich having obligations to provide it. Being poor or being propertied, Simmel (1965: 126) 
explained, is part of “the role that each concrete individual member of society performs”. The 
poor were “poor” most fundamentally in this organic relationship with the wealthy, which put 
them “approximately in the situation of the stranger to the group who finds himself, so to 
speak, outside the group in which he resides” (Simmel 1965: 124–125). Even among the 
materially wealthy classes, Simmel observed, there were people who were not poor in terms of 
an incapacity to meet fundamental needs, but in terms of deprivation relative to the expectations 
of their class; therefore, “[t]he poor, as a sociological category, are not those who suffer specific 
deficiencies and deprivations, but those who receive assistance or should receive it according to 
social norms” (Simmel 1965: 138). 
This conception, of course, does not seek to portray poverty as a social construct in the 
narrow sense that, were one to stop perceiving or treating the poor as needing assistance, 
poverty would suddenly end. Rather, following Simmel, poverty means being in need relative 
to others in the same society, and relative to its expectations and norms. The social relations 
which hold people attached to society but simultaneously hold them unequal are the true 
essence of poverty. People’s relative position in society reduces or enhances their absolute 
capabilities to attain life goals and social recognition (Sen 1983). Only through the fact that 
some people have the resources to more fully exercise their capabilities is others’ incapacity 
to fulfil their own capabilities rendered tangible as poverty (Sen 1993). While the capability 
deprivation very often correlates with lack of income or assets, the most fundamental relation 
of poverty is the inherently social relation between the capabilities a person has and the 
freedoms society makes attainable to them (Sen 1999: 67–81). 
Even if poverty’s manifestations are felt and perceived in absolute terms, it 
fundamentally remains a relationship between people which is mediated by the realms of 
production and exchange, and globalisation shifts the scale of these relations with economic 
integration and the emergence of a global society. Post-development theorist Yapa therefore 
conceptualises poverty as consisting in global social relations, arguing that no conception of 
“poor” could exist without corresponding conceptions of “nonpoor”. Mediated through the 
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production sphere, discourses of poverty and nonpoverty generate recognition and acceptance 
of the material symptoms while simultaneously hiding the causes of the concrete phenomena 
which are lumped together as “poverty”. 
Such an abstraction is useful if it helps us address the problem of poverty, but when 
it fails, this conception should be replaced by more concrete considerations of food, 
shelter, and health. The concrete question “What causes hunger, homelessness, and 
ill-health?” yields substantially different answers from those we get from the 
question “What causes poverty?” (Yapa 1996: 717) 
If poverty then is generated in social relations – discursively as well as materially – 
rather than constituting an a priori “natural” condition, it can take many different forms as it 
“reflects historically particular social relations, and it is neither permanent nor inevitable” 
(Saurin 1996: 675). Poverty as a relation - this is certainly not a novel argument (cf. 
McMichael 2004), but rather a condition for the claim of this book that microfinance makes 
the poverty-producing allocation of the fruits of labour, as well as attempts to change the 
allocation, an issue of finance. Important debates about correct definitions and concept-
ualisations are fought elsewhere (for instance Chambers 2006; Misturelli and Heffernan 2008; 
Victor et al. 2013); a definitive, comprehensive conceptualisation would be moot here. Rather, 
the following pages take note of and problematise how our theories about poverty’s origin or 
creation affect our theories of how to produce nonpoverty. For instance, in the post-war 
industrial variant of capitalism, poverty was primarily understood as lacking a (decent) job, 
and consequently Fordist social policy aimed to produce more decent employment relations. 
In the financialised variant of capitalism, poverty is increasingly understood as lacking 
(decent) finance; consequently the aim of economic policy becomes to produce more financial 
relations. Microfinance, I propose, thereby turns poverty into a financial relation, both in the 
discursive sense (Yapa) of being understood as lack of finance, and the material-political 
sense (Simmel) of a new institution to manage the poor. This combination of the discursive 
and material dimensions of poverty underlies the following analysis. 
This chapter systematically elaborates the connections already suggested above 
between microfinance, poverty and financialisation. As set out in Chapter 1, the question at 
stake here is not whether microfinance “works” at reducing poverty – for which negative (at 
least, zero-impact) findings already abound – but what microfinance works at, and how? The 
answer I offer is that microfinance financialises poverty: it works to turn poverty into a 
problem of finance and makes it the basis for new credit relations which serve surplus 
extraction. As Elyachar (2005: 28) notes, financialisation has long gone hand-in-hand with 
accumulation through dispossession, and microfinance here is a “mode that speaks the 
language of empowering the poor”; in Elyachar’s Egyptian case, this was through NGOs 
seeking to socially integrate specific populations by drawing them into capitalist market 
relations, while simultaneously dispossessing them of their traditional identities. As I argue, 
microfinance increasingly also serves even more fundamentally to make poverty directly 
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useful for capital accumulation by rendering the labour power of borrowers accessible and 
valuable for financial markets and financial market actors. 
Underlying this analysis is the understanding of financialisation as the recent and 
ongoing expansion of the frontier of financial accumulation, based on changes in politics, 
economics, social relations, and culture; as not merely a process over time, but one of finance 
reaching outwards into new realms and settling and enclosing new terrains for capital 
accumulation. In today’s rich countries, many aspects of life are increasingly financialised, 
such that from daily purchases to life-cycle planning – credit cards, student loans, defined-
contribution pensions, etc. – the financial nexus extends into ever more areas of life. True: not 
everything is (equally) financialised – political, social and cultural barriers limitations limit 
the financialisation of some realms – and financialisation has hardly proved to be a smooth 
process; but finance is indubitably becoming more pervasive; the frontier is expanding. In the 
Global South, microfinance is a key vehicle for pushing the frontier of financial accumulation 
into the slums, villages, economic activities and everyday lives of poor people. 
My argument, below, that microfinance is financialising poverty draws upon the 
financialisation literature and the different meaning(s) of money and credit, to connect these 
with the emerging literature that engages microfinance from a political economy perspective. 
I argue in three steps. In the first section I argue that microfinance builds on mobilising 
narratives, appropriate only to a financialised world, which bestow moral urgency and 
normative power onto processes of financialisation (Section A); that, second, microfinance 
constructs a form of governmentality via credit through which financial logics and discipline 
are fed down the credit chain into the everyday practices of the involved actors (Section B); 
third, microfinance constructs a material relation between the owners of finance (creditors 
and investors), via intermediaries (MFIs), with the users (borrowers), which allows surplus 
extraction to take place through finance (Section C). 
Mobilising narratives 
Stories and building blocks 
The expansion of microfinance as part of the process of financialisation has hinged on 
mobilising narratives which act as affirmative and prohibitive stories about what finance can 
and should do; about what is right and wrong, about where and how finance should operate. 
As Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 51, 55–56) explain, “the human mind is built to think in terms 
of narratives”, particularly when it comes to “the expectations for personal success in 
business, the success of entrepreneurial ventures, and for payoffs to human capital” which 
underlie financial decisions. Such narratives which give meaning to finance historically 
feature centrally in processes of financial change: as Calder (1999) shows, the acceptance of 
debt into the household as part of a “normal” and “decent” lifestyle required an active 
redefinition of what it meant to use credit – the emergence of a new, positive narrative. 
Similarly, Harrington (2008) shows how during the “dot-com” bubble people came together 
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in groups to create, affirm and celebrate new and desirable identities as “investors”, enacting 
new narratives of social rise and participation through finance. Following de Goede (2005), 
more fundamentally Western finance has always followed strongly gendered narratives which 
gave meaning to financial practices by aligning them with desirable or less desirable 
identities. 
While stories and mobilising narratives always matter in finance, in microfinance they 
are even more salient. Microfinance is anchored in the contemporary public imaginary 
through certain narratives of empowerment through finance (cf. Elyachar 2012) and of 
poverty as a problem of finance. Credit (or its inverse – debt) is represented and understood as 
a force for liberating women from traditional gender identities, allowing innate entrepreneurs 
to prosper, or helping poor people manage their difficult economic lives better – a narrative 
which has finance granting the “power to” develop. The ubiquitous client success stories in 
donor organisations’ and MFIs’ publications, as well as countless media exposés, are key 
building blocks of the narrative. A few archetypical examples from the literature produced by 
MFIs and donor organisations will be instructive: 
At first, Mary was very shy, and wouldn’t look me in the face … Later, when she took 
me to see her home and meet her family, her whole demeanor changed. It’s obvious 
that she is so proud of all she has accomplished … The family struggled to put three 
meals on the table, and lived with relatives because they couldn’t afford a home of 
their own. Then Mary heard about Opportunity International on the radio and from 
other Opportunity clients, and applied for her first Trust Group loan of 30,000 kwacha 
($200) to buy more used clothing to sell in the market. She was able to repay her loan 
within five months. She is now on her fifth loan of 30,000 kwacha. … She has also 
diversified into selling her home-grown maize and produce in the Mathambi Trading 
Center, and rents out 10 two-bedroom homes that she owns. (Greenwood 2011) 
[E]ven though she worked hard to grow her tiny businesses, Rukia was never able to 
put aside any savings and her dreams remained out of reach. Then, Rukia applied for 
and received a microloan from ACCION’s partner Uganda Microfinance Union 
(UMU), enabling her to add more profitable products – dried beans and fruit – to her 
inventory. Gradually her profits have increased and she has since been able to move 
her business to a permanent stall on the busy main street outside the market where she 
attracts even more customers. Thanks to her perseverance and UMU’s loans, Rukia’s 
goal of constructing a house is finally within grasp. “We’ve already made the 
foundation and purchased some of the bricks,” Rukia states proudly. (ACCION 2004: 
8) 
Nilufa Yeasmin has dreamed of opening her own beauty parlour for years … In 
December, Nilufa took a loan of Tk.50,000 from ASA’s SEL program. She combined 
this with money invested by her family and opened Tanha Beauty Parlour on January 
1st, 2004 … Nilufa’s business has given [her daughter] Joya the opportunity to move 
home from Dhaka. As family plays an important role in Bangladesh’s social structure, 
Joya is extremely happy that she has been able to obtain employment close to her 
home village. (ASA 2004: 2) 
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While modest in size, Karoline’s restaurant holds within it the hopes and dreams of an 
entire family. Formerly a fruit vendor in an outdoor market, Karoline was the sole 
breadwinner for her family and three children … She applied for a loan from ACCION 
partner Akiba Commercial Bank and was able to start a small restaurant. Five years 
and several loans later, Karoline’s restaurant is now equipped with a refrigerator and a 
juice maker, and she also owns a small cereal business next door. Most importantly, 
she is able to provide for her family and three adorable children. … she is now more 
optimistic than ever. “I worked on a farm when I was a child, but I want a better life 
for my children. I want them to go to university, and to become pilots and doctors. 
(ACCION 2005: 8) 
Written in colourful, evocative prose, and reporting or promising impacts from the 
relatively mundane to the spectacular (10 homes; pilots and doctors), and often accompanied 
by uplifting images (cf. Schwittay 2013b), the microfinance ubiquitous client success stories 
revolve around the idea that finance can build pride and inspire. The client story genre over-
proportionately tells women’s stories; after all, approximately ¼ of borrowers are men. 
Usually by reporting about a family business, the stories focus on the woman’s success with 
the loan and her business, blinkering a more complicated gendered reality and hiding 
women’s “positional vulnerability” (Rahman 1999: 69).  1   These stories of success and 
minor economic miracles (for instance, Mary’s progression from homelessness to trader and 
landlord) are each a building block for the narrative of microfinance as helping poor people 
(women) individually improve their lives, and those of their families, through well-
intentioned debt. The mobilising aspect of the empowerment narrative lies in the invitation to 
become part of the narrative by supporting microfinance; which in turn allows Westerners to 
spin their own narratives about their own humanitarian lending activities (Black 2013). 
ACCION’s client stories all, for instance, even come accompanied with the note: “For more 
information or to make a donation online, please visit www.accion.org and click on “Donate 
Now” on the home page.” 
But there is also a more fundamental narrative (below the empowerment level) woven 
into the fabric of the microfinance construct: social problems are problems of finance. 
Microfinance makes poverty in the Global South comprehensible to (primarily Northern) 
middle and upper classes by proposing a solution to poverty on terms they can understand and 
identify with. “We” do not know Mary, Rukia, Nilufa, or Karoline, and have no meaningful 
comprehension of the realities of their lives, but are invited to imagine their situations through 
stories of small successful businesses crafted with finance. When protagonists like 
Muhammad Yunus preach that the poor need access to finance in order to fulfil their 
potential, this evidently rings instinctively true to Western middle and upper classes for 
whom, as the financialisation literature shows, economic and social success is increasingly 
determined by their success or failure at managing finance. While their circumstances and 
constraints remain fundamentally different, the rich and the poor are seemingly aligned in the 
microfinance narrative through their shared new identity as subjects of finance. Social 
problems appear as mere problems of individual access to finance; not politics, economic 
justice, or collective action. 
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Microfinance as moral money 
The particularly vivid fascination for microfinance among some of the wealthiest IT 
entrepreneurs showcases the power of these narratives of empowerment through finance and 
of poverty as a problem of finance. Bill Gates, Michael Dell or Pierre Omidyar all can 
evidently align their own biographies with notions of an entrepreneurial escape from poverty 
in the Global South. At $133 million, the Gates Foundation’s expenditure on “Financial 
Services for the Poor” in 2009 was the second-largest among the spending categories in its 
largest programme, “Global Development” (Gates Foundation 2009).  2   In 2005, EBay 
founder Pierre Omidyar donated $100 million to his alma mater Tufts University, conditional 
on it being invested exclusively in commercial microfinance (Tufts 2010). 
The freedom and desire of such wealthy individuals to reshape social relations and 
behaviours with credit elsewhere in accordance with their personal values also extends to 
many Western middle class people, who often active in similar ways. The roughly 1.6 million 
users (Kiva 2014) of the on-line microlending platform Kiva (see also Chapter 2) seek to 
“implement their moral visions of ‘good society’ through more or less institutionalized forms 
of philanthropic giving”, as Bajde (2011: 6) explains (cf. Bajde 2013). From an analysis of 
user commentary on Kiva’s website, Bajde finds Kiva lenders enacting their own social 
visions through microfinance loans, identifying with the borrowers and treating “the loan as 
an affirmation of their personal moral beliefs” (Bajde 2011: 17). As Black (2013) shows, Kiva 
lenders associate their actions with notions of care, reciprocity and worldliness, while 
emphasising individual responsibility. But differently from charitable donations, Kiva lenders 
are entitled to a financial return (loan repayment, but no interest) as well ongoing financial 
information flows about borrowers’ repayments. This allows – as Kiva co-founder Jessica 
Jackley puts it – “the average individual to feel like a mini-Bill Gates by building a portfolio 
of investments in businesses around the globe” (Bajde 2011: 18). The would-be small-scale 
philanthropist assumes the new identity of Kiva investor, the would-be recipient of generosity 
the identity of investee. Kiva’s microfinance-charitable vernacular always refers to borrowers 
as “working poor” – “replacing”, as Bajde explains, “the outstretched empty hand of the 
helpless beggar with the ‘full hands’ of hardworking entrepreneurs, who have ‘something to 
offer’” (Bajde 2011: 15). 
Kiva’s promise of finance-based poverty alleviation is presented as fundamentally 
morally superior to giving-based efforts: 
‘Traditional charity’ is suggested to focus on the suffering, helplessness and 
hopelessness of the poor, thus provoking feelings of despair, guilt and shame. 
Conversely, micro lending and (by extension) Kiva are presented as an effective, 
hope-inspiring, egalitarian opportunity for ordinary individuals to actively participate 
in poverty alleviation. (Bajde 2011: 13) 
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Microfinance thereby increases the options open to such “ordinary” philanthropists, 
particularly over the temporal dimension, as loans are usually repaid and the user can re-
perform her act of “entrepreneurial charity” using the same money, while transforming but 
also narrowing how people imagine poverty and practice giving: 
The ‘alternative’ conceptions of philanthropy, poverty and social progress … prove 
relatively narrow and partial when scrutinized closely. For instance, Kiva’s ‘positive’ 
view of poverty turns a blind eye to the poor who fail to qualify as the worthy 
‘working poor’ and Kiva’s celebration of micro lending (at times explicitly) relies on 
devaluing unilateral philanthropic giving as patronizing and receiving help as 
shameful. (Bajde 2011: 22) 
Not necessarily cynically, wealth-holders evidently find pleasure in the notion of 
poor people working hard, finding dignity in work, and pursuing the hope of liberating 
themselves from poverty. Aleman Delfs (2010: 14, 1) notes how this “idealism of 
microfinance [...] indicates neoliberalism is alive and well”. As Shipler (2004) discusses, 
Americans (not unlike many people in other advanced capitalist nations) distinguish strongly 
between the “deserving poor” and “undeserving poor”, as in (not) deserving of help. The most 
deserving in this moral rubric are the “working poor” who might, despite their greatest 
exertions, remain poor, but at least have earned the respect of the nonpoor for their not being 
lazy or resigned. Microfinance, in promising help only through self-help, offers a means of 
intervention that ensures only the deserving poor will benefit. 
Recalling Zelizer’s (1997) finding that what constitutes legitimate “poor people’s 
money” has been a historically shifting category, we may note that today’s microfinance 
narrative proposes a morally uplifting type of credit as the new “good” money for the poor, as 
opposed to the “dole” whose legitimation over 100 years ago Zelizer traced. In this sense it 
appears almost as if contemporary capitalist societies have regressed to a Victorian morality 
where they suspect “easy” or “free” money to be inherently morally corrupting, while credit – 
coming at the price of interest, and bringing discipline – is seen as enabling a decent, moral 
life. Without this moralisation of credit it would be hard to comprehend why many charitable 
organisations have gifted large sums to microfinance institutions. For instance, Oxfam gave 
$6 million to various MFIs in 2006 (MIX 2010b), instead of rendering money or services to 
poor people directly. In 2009, a total of nearly $2.7 billion were donated to MFIs as cross-
border grants (El-Zoghbi/Gähwiler/Lauer 2011: 10). 
For such capital providers who are interested only in investing, rather than performing 
charity – for instance, in using microfinance investments to diversify their portfolio or hedge 
against risk (Krauss/Walter 2009) – microfinance may well serve a strictly financial purpose. 
In spite of recent crises, which dampened returns in some markets, microfinance investments 
have overall appeared highly attractive thanks to the unparalleled reliability of loan 
repayments – as enthusiasts put it: “The Poor Always Pay Back” (Dowla/Barua 2006).  3   The 
95 to 99 percent loan recovery  4   paired with high interest rates proposed microfinance 
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securities and bonds as (at least potentially) highly attractive investment for the financial 
mainstream. Microfinance securities and bond issues are increasingly one financial asset 
among others. Yet, importantly, microfinance additionally appeals to the imagination and 
self-esteem of even a most return-oriented investor by promising results which few other 
investments can deliver: positive social change. 
MFIs’ financial attractiveness is buttressed by the presentation of microfinance as a 
“social investment” that generates additional value under a “double bottom line” of social and 
financial returns.  5   As Beckert (2011) shows, many economic acts would be impossible 
without an element of “fictionality” allowing actors to imagine the future consequences of 
their actions. “These fictional depictions take narrative form. […] Financial markets are 
especially prone to giving rise to such stories about events in the future” (Beckert 2011: 7–8). 
Under conditions of uncertainty, investors must base their expectations on stories or dreams 
about what the future would be like, if only they gave their money, such that some markets 
can even represent “markets for dreams” (Lutter 2010).  6   Beckert’s (2010) conception of 
“imaginative value”, built through “storytelling” about goods (Bogdanova 2013), helps 
explain the appeal of microfinance in even the return-seeking investor is rewarded today, by 
already “consuming” a sensation of having done “good”, while awaiting her financial returns 
tomorrow. The “imagined future” (Beckert 2011) which the investor values in microfinance 
strongly hinges on morally mobilising narratives; she cannot know with any certainty whether 
the activities funded by her will actually create successes in faraway villages or slums, but can 
imagine these successes thanks to stories about the miraculous effects of microloans. As seen 
above, the ostensible successes of microfinance are mostly communicated in story form. 
Embarrassed millionaires and poor portfolio managers 
Reinforcement for the narratives of empowerment through finance and of poverty being a 
problem of finance comes from the vision of poor people as inherently (or even exceptionally) 
financially-minded subjects. The book Portfolios of the Poor, authored by a team of 
practitioners and academics who tracked borrowers’ financial lives via financial diaries, has 
emerged as the key text of the ascendant “financial inclusion” paradigm.  7   Engagingly 
written, but not addressed to very broad audiences, Portfolios chiefly provides legitimation 
among development practitioners and microfinance experts for their visions of helping poor 
people master their lives via financial services. The poor are depicted as Third-World 
“portfolio managers” (Collins et al. 2009: 238), as savvy and skilful as their Wall Street 
counterparts, and equally in need of finance. Portfolios portrays the denizens of megacity 
slums and remote villages, to follow John Steinbeck, effectively as “temporarily embarrassed 
millionaires” who have merely lost their bank accounts.  8  
Underlying the claims of Portfolios’ authors is the assumption that low-income 
individuals in the Global South are guided by the cognitive framework of the purest specimen 
of homo oeconomicus: the free investor. The authors interpreted nearly every financial 
decision inscribed in their subjects’ financial diaries as rational and optimal, to ultimately 
deduce that MFIs should feed poor people’s ubiquitous credit needs for everything, not just 
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micro-entrepreneurship. Using a loan at 36 percent interest to buy gold jewellery, as one 
diarist did, was a sensible choice, since “[t]he fact that the loan could be repaid in a series of 
small weekly payments made it manageable. […] Price was only one aspect of the loan, less 
important than the repayment schedule that matched instalments to the household’s cash 
flow” (Collins et al. 2009: 23). That this diarist had to pay a 36 percent surcharge for her 
“investment”, relative to what others would have had to pay, was a non-issue. The authors of 
Portfolios concluded from their study of 250 households: 
money management is, for the poor, a fundamental and well-understood part of 
everyday life. It is a key factor in determining the level of success that poor 
households enjoy in improving their own lives … It was, surprisingly, the tools of 
corporate finance – balance sheets and cash-flow statements – that offered the 
structure with which we could begin to understand what it takes, day by day, for poor 
households to live on so little. (Collins et al. 2009: 3, 5) 
Surprisingly indeed, because what these economists observed were not actually 
portfolios, but the budgets, of poor people. That poor people must budget skilfully should 
surprise only observers with Victorian-era assumptions about the poor as foolish spendthrifts. 
And furthermore: skilful budgeting is not portfolio management. Poor people must square 
their low incomes with low expenses and with their desire to save; this is an act of budgeting, 
of juggling with money and debt, of matching incomes and obligations in order to sustain 
financially (cf. Guérin et al. 2014). Portfolio management, contrarily, is the voluntary 
assignment of capital to different asset classes with various expected returns and associated 
risks - not the act of making ends meet, no matter how creatively. Portfolio theory since 
Markowitz (1952) has been about matching risks with rewards, “realizing the largest possible 
gain with exposure to the least possible risk” (Bernstein 1992: 44) by a fictional “free 
investor” (Ortiz 2011) who seeks an optimal allocation of capital. 
Collins et. al. do acknowledge that most risks faced by poor people are no matter of 
choice, but inescapable realities. Yet nonetheless they chose to evaluate their subjects’ money 
matters using a theoretical framework designed for risk-pricing capital assets under 
hypothetical free-market conditions. Even more bizarrely, the book takes into consideration 
only cash flows and stocks, failing to study the non-monetised transfers and exchanges which 
are essential to the economic lives of the poor, which is more a scientific failure of omission 
than a limitation of their study. The authors only explain: “because our story is focused on 
how poor households manage money, we have focused our discussion only on those 
transactions where cash was involved” (Collins et al. 2009: 11). Why the authors would do 
this – especially after noting that physical assets actually made up the largest share of their 
diarists’ possessions – can only be understood if their aim, rather than a finding of the book, 
was to convince policy-makers and investors of a need for microfinance. 
The book’s weightiest contribution to the narrative of poverty as a problem of finance, 
and its most evident fallacy, is its conclusion: “Not having enough money is bad enough. Not 
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being able to manage whatever money you have is worse” (Collins et al. 2009: 184). Ergo, 
poverty-as-a-lack-of-money is pretty bad, but poverty-as-a-lack-of-financial-tools is worse; 
therefore the poor need more financial tools. This logic is powerful but patently false, as can 
be demonstrated by formulating its (true) inverse: not being able to manage whatever money 
you have is bad enough; not having enough money to manage is worse. With this erroneous 
syllogism, Portfolios illuminates how the ascendant “financial inclusion” paradigm differs 
from the original entrepreneurship microfinance concept: the aim is no longer to increase the 
resources available to the poor, but by drawing them into the formal financial market, simply 
to improve the efficiency with which they marshal their meagre resources. 
TINA 
The “financial inclusion” discourse, as we see, is based on mobilising narratives 
which present new finance as a solution to old problems. The darker side of the narratives is 
revealed in an explanation given by Muhammad Yunus for how he conceived of microfinance 
originally: 
I never intended to become a moneylender. I had no intention of lending money to 
anyone. All I really wanted was to solve an immediate problem … My work became 
a struggle to show that the financial untouchables are actually touchable, even 
huggable. To my great surprise, the repayment of loans by people who borrow 
without collateral has proven to be much better than those whose borrowings are 
secured by assets. Indeed, more than 98 per cent of our loans are repaid. The poor 
know that this credit is their only opportunity to break out of poverty. They do not 
have any cushion whatsoever to fall back on. If they fall afoul of this one loan, they 
will have lost their one and only chance to get out of the rut. (Yunus 2003: 58) 
In Yunus’ account, utter pragmatism sits side-by-side with polarising, even 
threatening, rhetoric. The Grameen founder claims to have inadvertently stumbled into and 
transformed the age-old practice of moneylending, only to subsequently present his variation 
on moneylending as the “only opportunity to break out of poverty”. Akin to Margaret 
Thatcher’s “TINA”, for Yunus and his disciples, There Is No Alternative to the financial 
market way out of poverty. Rather than questioning the lack of options open to poor people in 
Bangladesh and elsewhere, Yunus suggests that the failure to take a loan and employ it 
usefully revokes one’s right to a better life. Thus the champions of microfinance themselves 
underscore what Elyachar (2005: 217) signifies with her quip that “empowerment teaches us 
to blame victims for their problems”. 
The narratives grant lenders such as Grameen Bank great moral and practical power; 
the polarising rhetoric about “financial untouchables” and “huggable” poor seeks to stymie 
opposition – after all, who would discriminate against the poor like outcastes?  9   To take 
another example from Yunus’ repertoire: he has argued (to international acclaim) that the 
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latest economic crisis was produced by the same “financial apartheid” which he lamented at 
the 1997 Microcredit Summit. The crisis was caused by banks lending to wealthy people but 
ignoring the poor - “financial institutions and banking systems of advanced economies 
focused on big banks and big customers” should refocus on normal people (Yunus 2011). 
Opening a lucid view onto the normative content of financialisation, this definition of the 
problem paints a drastic and odd picture in the context of a crisis which was triggered by 
subprime lending. Yet Yunus’ problem-definition once again calls for more financial 
expansion while conveniently sidelining criticism by associating critiques of microlending 
with the racism, bigotry and political repression of South Africa before 1994. Luckily, an easy 
solution-narrative is at hand: give microloans to the poor, so they can be financially included, 
and then even apartheid can be overcome. 
The expansion of the transnational financial system through microfinance hinges on 
the success of these mobilising narratives which represent finance as empowering (superior to 
charity or redistributive alternatives) and poverty as a problem of finance. The narratives feed 
the imagination of capital-providers, advancing financial market expansion by supplementing 
financial investments with social appeal. Poor people are represented as financially hyper-
rational subjects who more urgently need financial services than direct poverty relief (since 
“not being able to manage whatever money you have is worse”), and the microfinance 
sector’s icon even argues that debt is poor people’s only escape route from poverty. With 
these powerfully affirmative narratives, microfinance is a leading frontier of contemporary 
financialisation, both politically and economically. The following two sections will discuss 
why, despite the good intentions of the rich mobilised by the narratives, the practical effects 
are most disempowering for the poor. 
Financialised governmentality 
Government and governmentality 
The global deployment of microfinance shows political implications, both explicit public 
policy changes and a more insidious governmentality. Heloise Weber has illuminated at least 
since the millennium – when with only $2.17 billion microcredit was still a niche activity – 
how it served to facilitate the expansion, liberalisation and transnationalisation of low-income 
countries’ financial sectors. “[A]s a financially steered targeted poverty reduction strategy,” 
Weber (2002: 541) argues, “microcredit, via its implications for policy, facilitates financial 
sector liberalisation as well as extending the policy of trade in financial services to the local 
level”. Since the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF (directly as well as through subsidiaries 
such as CGAP) had employed microcredit to impose an “enabling environment” for financial 
services via their development programming. Microcredit, following Weber, served 
strategically to push economic and financial liberalisation and integration in the guise of 
poverty reduction. 
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Starting with Bolivia in the 1980s, microcredit featured in Structural Adjustment 
Plans, concomitantly with policies for reforming national financial sectors and easing 
international capital flows. MFIs’ needs for capital infusions from abroad acted as a “pro-
poor” justification for capital accounts to be liberalised, while conversely the economic 
transformations wrought by adjustment amplified the poverty-push activities in the informal 
sector which demanded to be supported by microcredit: 
In this context, arguments that purport the compelling necessity to increase the 
supply of credit, in order to enhance the access to credit for potential entrepreneurs 
emerge. The liberalization of the financial sector is then presented as a central 
component of this ‘enabling environment’, with the underlying objective being to 
increase access to credit. (Weber 2004: 362–363) 
The leverage of microfinance in shaping national financial policy environments 
should not be underestimated. CGAP, for instance, authoritatively publishes guidelines which 
are global in scope for financial regulators, and whose aims explicitly extend beyond specific 
regulation of MFIs. Preventing “regulatory arbitrage” by financial players, CGAP argues, 
would require a “level playing field” which accommodates the needs of MFIs in a broader 
regulatory environment characterised by lighter documentation and no interest rate controls 
(Christen et al. 2012). The political clout of a large national microfinance sector could also 
recently be witnessed in Hillary Clinton’s – as Jagdish Bhagwati (2011) analysed it – 
“arrogantly intervening” in Bangladeshi politics after Muhammad Yunus was removed from 
his post as head of Grameen Bank. The Bangladeshi government alleged that U.S. 
intervention against Yunus’ curtailment was behind a subsequent World Bank decision to halt 
funding for the country’s largest infrastructure project, the Padma Bridge; Bank officials 
never denied this (Daily Sun 2011). 
But this active deployment of microfinance as a visible policy instrument shows only 
part of the picture. The concept of gouvernementalité developed by Foucault (2010) affords a 
wider view including the subtler technologies of power which are at least equally important, 
and which Weber (2002: 541) refers to as microcredit’s “disciplinary potential”. Covering 
both the traditional realm of state sovereignty and beyond, governmentality offers a 
perspective onto power in which “political leadership is only one form of government among 
others”, where “government refers to a continuum, which extends from political government 
right through to forms of self-regulation, namely ‘technologies of the self’ as Foucault calls 
them” (Lemke 2001: 201). Particularly under neoliberalism, states and supranational bodies – 
far from losing power to markets or civil society – have evolved more indirect techniques to 
lead and control, without simultaneously taking responsibility for welfare (Lemke 2001: 202 
ff.). Finance – microfinance – as a gendered “governmental strategy” (Rankin 2001: 20) could 
help supply both the requisite autonomy and discipline needed for market-based social 
relations to form the basis of social action in the neoliberal setting. 
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“[N]otions such as empowerment and self-fulfillment […] are not apolitical but a 
terrain that is organized and managed”, and hinge at least as much on discipline as 
emancipation (Brigg 2001: 248). For Brigg (2006: 70) the emphasis in microfinance on 
empowerment through self-fulfilment contributes to “a greater penetration of power into the 
social body of the Third World, and the closer integration of Third World subjects into the 
global development dispositif,” with NGOs acting as key interlocutors of neoliberal visions of 
development. The exercise of “power-knowledge” in organised relationships helps generate 
“disciplinary individuals” who act in a self-controlled manner, neither due to violence nor 
consent, but out of an ingrained discipline (Merquior 1991: 108–118). Microcredit operations 
deploy a system of disciplinary techniques, particularly at the micro level, which organise 
borrowers to regulate each other and themselves through rituals, implicit power hierarchies 
and delayed gratification, in the interest of generating entrepreneurial selves for development 
(Brigg 2001). 
Financial chains across space 
For Young (2010: 607), microfinance’s expansion has been part of a “financialisation of 
space” which strategically repositions places and people “in relation to the perceived 
opportunities or risks they present to global capital flows”. Financial flows and the associated 
practices of accounting, rating and benchmarking, represent “geopolitical technologies” which 
structure development pathways at the macro level and social roles and identities at the micro 
level. For instance, in Andhra Pradesh, microlending created new gendered opportunities 
which were 
predominantly taken up by young, middle-class/caste men because of perceptions 
about their natural abilities to be mobile, to adapt to new technologies, and to 
embody the kind of ‘fiscal responsibility’ that is sought in their clients. Their 
mobility is linked to new forms of cultural assertion, as many of these young men 
see themselves as financial entrepreneurs, connecting remote villages to global 
capital flows. (Young 2010: 608) 
From his interviews and observation of MFI staff, Young offers an illustrative 
account of the hard and minutious work underlying the power to mediate transnational 
financial relations at the grassroots level: 
I accompanied field officers, by motorbike or car … They would arrive at the branch 
offices at around 6:30 in the morning and leave to visit villages soon afterwards. 
Meetings followed a strict regime. A group of around twenty clients would gather 
together and sit in a circle and the meeting would open with an oath said by the 
women in which they promised to use the money for the benefit of their families and 
make their repayments on time. The field officer would then collect the week’s 
repayments and, if all the groups paid their full instalments, new loans would be 
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dispensed and credit needs discussed. These meetings lasted around twenty minutes, 
after which the field officer left to another meeting, perhaps in another village. The 
afternoons would be spent transferring the data from the day’s business onto a 
computer at the branch office. From there it was e-mailed to the Head Office, 
thereby providing the hard data that would later be used to attract new investments. 
In the early evening, new villages were visited and surveys conducted, in which the 
quality of housing and small enterprise potential was assessed. (Young 2010: 617–
618) 
My personal work experience in the mid-2000s with an internationally leading small 
and medium enterprise (SME) lender, which at the time still self-declared as a microfinance 
bank, showed me a similar framework of financial relations built on close observation, intense 
reporting, commitment rituals, discipline, and group validation. Accompanying field staff in a 
subsidiary bank in South-Eastern Europe, I observed the interactions between loan officers 
and clients. The organisation no longer made group loans so that, for assessing new clients, 
meetings were scheduled at potential clients’ homes or business locations, where the loan 
officer subjectively (and usually very critically) appraised and interrogated the applicant’s 
self-reported business data and the plausibility of their verbally communicated business plans. 
The young, upwardly-mobile, mixed-gender loan officers spent afternoons and evenings in 
their offices entering the collected data into a standardised digital assessment tool, and 
subsequently deliberating disbursement decisions in a group meeting. They fed the day’s 
transaction data (disbursements, repayments, etc.) into a database maintained by local 
management information systems (MIS) technicians who ensured data standardisation and 
quality, and managed its transferral to a centralised database at corporate headquarters (in 
another country). 
At corporate HQ, central MIS specialists would collate all the different countries’ 
financial data, which was regularly scrutinised by the managers; variations, errors, or delays 
could prompt urgent demands from senior management for clarification, correction or 
delivery. Data was required to be rigorously up-to-date and could be requested at short notice 
without warning, for instance to be used in strategic decision-making or shown in meetings 
with investors - this made central MIS one of the highest-pressure jobs in the corporation. By, 
vice-versa, feeding the pressure for flawlessly transparent and up-to-date reporting of 
financial information down the financial chain from corporate HQ to client, the management 
of this multinational microfinance firm supervised and sustained a system of self-discipline 
which the employees generally accepted and respected for the financial success it engendered. 
The diligence imposed on MIS by management at headquarters fed down to the borrowers as 
financial governmentality, and on the ground translated into such practices as loan officers 
personally visiting borrowers (courteously, but inquisitively and determinedly) on the first 
instance they were one day late on repayments, to remind them of their contractual 
obligations; this usually sufficed, and was seen as a normal feature of building a long-term 
mutually-beneficent relationship with the client. 
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Both Young’s and my observations underscore how the microfinance relationship by 
no means operates exclusively on an authoritarian basis, but on a mix of power devices. Loan 
officers in India, for instance, called female borrowers of all ages as “mother” (hama/amma), 
in accordance with local codes of respect; as Young (2010: 619) observed, “a judicious 
balancing of humility and assertion is a key index of [the] successful masculinity” which loan 
officers employed. In my own experience, clients were always treated with business-like 
courtesy, which together with the immediate visit (in the event of delay) the loan officers 
understood as a way of generating awe amongst their clients. But the MFI-client relationship 
in microfinance remains fundamentally predicated on a – normally implicit, when necessary 
explicit – regime of (frequently gender-coloured) observation, discipline, and sanctioning. 
Rahman (1998: 166) notes how the demands of financial “sustainability” require MFI 
employees, often also NGO staff, to “employ coercive methods and use local power-
hierarchies in instalment collection and loan investment instead of borrower empowerment 
and solidarity envisaged by the Bank in its public transcript”. 
Young’s, Rahman’s, and my observations (among others) showcase the sophisticated 
labour-intensive and technology-intensive techniques which MFIs employ for evaluating and 
constantly re-appraising the “opportunities or risks” which individuals “present to global 
capital flows” (Young 2010: 607). These serve to establish a financial governmentality in 
which the MFI operates like a veritable Panopticon of economic activity in slums and villages 
previously remote from mainstream capital circuits, using borrowers as objects of information 
on the basis of which financial capital can extend into new niches in the global economic 
periphery.  10   MFIs’ work consists in constructing transnational credit relations between 
borrowers and return-seeking capital providers, based on close observation, standardisation, 
discipline, and the transmission of results through financial metrics. 
Finance for its own sake 
Emphasising the need to gain more capital to reach more poor people, the microfinance sector 
has progressively transformed since the 1980s from a fuzzy NGO domain into a disciplined 
business sector appealing to investment capital. Discussing the case of the foremost Mexican 
MFI (see also Chapter 2), which charges well over 100 percent annual interest and has 
generated high returns for investors on the stock market, Aitken suggests CompartamosBanco 
as a prime example of a process of financialisation within microfinance. Compartamos’ IPO 
consummates a particular kind of financialization in which high rates are designed 
primarily not to finance expansion but to constitute microfinance as a financial 
object itself, an object capable of generating and sustaining forms of financial profit 
and accumulation. Financialization becomes, in this perspective, an end in and of 
itself. (Aitken 2010: 234) 
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Compartamos was praised – by those who benefited from the share flotation, Aitken 
adds – and criticised by detractors for the same thing: its successful growth via retaining its 
earnings over years and attracting international investors. The ongoing accession of MFIs to 
formal financial markets, Aitken (2010: 224) infers, signals the arrival of “fringe credit” as 
part of “globalized financial flows”, drawing the poor and their lenders into the governance, 
viz. governmentality, of the transnational financial market.  11   Aitken proposes that 
Although microfinance has pursued a certain style of financialization from the outset 
in its commitment to deepening connections between the very poor and mainstream 
circuits of capital, recent developments are contributing to a transformation of 
microlending into a fully finanicalized object. And this is as an object capable of 
generating financial returns distant from its initial commitment to ‘social’ goals … 
This shift entails the rearticulation of microfinance into a category legible not in 
terms of its conventional association with ‘social responsibility’, but in terms of the 
‘normal science’ of finance. (Aitken 2010: 229, 232) 
This re-framing of microfinance in “normal” financial categories is reflective of an 
ongoing re-framing of finance itself as a normal social good, which – to follow de Goede 
(2005) – positions finance as no longer a contestable or dubious construct, but a universally 
rational and necessary tool. Cramer (2014) follows this normalisation thesis and highlights 
how the primary (or exclusive) framing of microfinancial success in terms of business results 
(betriebswirtschaftliche Leistung) by ostensibly disinterested international organisations such 
as CGAP collapses the means – the commercialisation of microfinance – with the ends, 
poverty reduction. The financialised framing of today’s microfinance displaces more 
complicated issues of poverty or gender impact via the easily quantifiable metrics of business 
achievement and lending technique, thereby generating highly “selective visibilities” wherein 
MFIs’ financial achievement becomes the unquestioned “meta-code” of success or failure 
(Cramer 2014). 
Concurrently with this invisibilisation of the social, the deeper interpenetration with 
mainstream financial circuits has enhanced the always-present potential for conflicts of 
interest, even in many proponents’ assessments, to the extent of engendering political 
backlash against microfinance (eg. Dowla 2014). This potential for conflict, revealed in the 
lengthening series of microfinance crises (Chapter 5), echoes in Eversole’s (2003: 185) 
investigation of borrowers’ perceptions of MFIs, which found that “on the ground, the 
interests of organizations and microentrepreneurs diverge. While creating strong, sustainable 
microfinance organizations is a priority for donors, businesspeople argue that it is they, not 
the organizations, who are the intended recipients of help for businesses”. Eversole (2003: 
185) quotes one borrower: “Tell us the truth, […] Is that money to benefit artisans, or is it to 
benefit the institutions?”. But in today’s market for microfinancial services, clients are 
expected to express their needs or (dis-)satisfaction in the financial metrics of demand and on-
time repayment. Donors or investors, communicating with the clients exclusively through this 
channel, are invited to read MFIs’ balance sheets as the principal measure of success: 
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the good institutions … pass the acid test: the clients, who are paying full price for 
services, vote with their feet and come back for more. Poor clients are borrowing, 
saving, repaying, and returning to purchase additional services at above-market 
interest rates. That is as honest an impact assessment as I need. (Malhotra 2000: 204) 
The logical collapsing of means and ends, of commercial success with social impact, 
is congruent with financialisation wherein finance no longer appears distinguishable from 
production and accumulation (Krippner 2011), but finance itself becomes the essential 
activity - where the magic happens. Consistent with Roodman’s assessment of microfinancial 
success as “industry building”, the metrics of durability and growth of the financial industry 
of microfinance serve as the key measure of success. 
The improvements in MFIs’ and borrowers’ financial discipline documented over the 
course of microfinance’s history have commonly been attributed to the integration of 
microfinance with mainstream financial markets which accompanied the diffusion of these 
metrics. Rhyne and Busch note: “While many prominent industry participants find themselves 
biased towards local ownership for a number of practical and philosophical reasons, 
international investors have brought important assets and discipline to some MFIs” 
(Rhyne/Busch 2006: 17, emphasis added). But the effect has hardly been that MFIs now 
target the most success-prone or Schumpeterian microentrepreneurs. Rather, as Young (2010) 
found, the risk-assessments performed by loan officers led them to particularly target women, 
above all married women, because of their lack of mobility and their adherence to socially-
sanctioned “women’s work”. In the interest of enforcing repayment, generally they preferred 
borrowers with “business plans” that would keep them in the village, such as holding 
buffaloes or operating sewing machines and corner stores.  12   These well-manageable 
activities from the perspective of the MFI incidentally also rank among the lowest value-
added, lowest-growth, most traditional and least economically transformative activities. 
Hidden behind the financial metrics of demand and repayment can lie any array of 
variously more or less salubrious economic activities which uphold demand for and 
repayment of microloans. Taylor (2011) examined the effects of the sudden surge of credit 
during the 2000s microfinance expansion in India, to which borrowers and other local 
economic agents reacted in different ways not predicted by the standard mobilising narratives. 
Borrowers, forced to adapt to the severe regularity of repayment schedules designed to ensure 
predictable cashflows, which bore little resemblance to their incomes and spending 
circumstances, reacted with often very perilous coping tactics: 
the temporalities of agrarian cash flows tend to be at odds with the monotonic pulse 
of weekly repayments that is built into the microfinance model. In this way, the 
infiltration of commercial microfinance created a further role for traditional 
moneylending to the extent that moneylenders have been able to lend to those who 
were overextended … Far from being swept away as an anachronistic hangover of 
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earlier, ‘pre-capitalist’ social relations, informal moneylending has therein adapted 
and expanded alongside the rise of microfinance. (Taylor 2011: 16) 
Many borrowers – particularly from relatively more advantaged castes – themselves 
began to pursue precisely the financial rationales which their new transnational credit 
relations implied, and “used such funds to begin moneylending activities … symptomatic of a 
neoliberal logic taken to its furthest expression” (Taylor 2011: 16). 
With the requirement to generate revenue and its frequent mismatch of financial 
rhythms to local productive bases, microfinance may be understood as a device for generating 
over time a special cognitive condition, an habitus built on certain skills and dispositions (cf. 
Bourdieu 1997) adapted to an increasingly financialised capitalism. Consequently, some 
people ultimately do come to perform their roles of Third-world portfolio managers; albeit for 
instance by becoming microfinance-enabled moneylenders. This acquiescence and creative 
adaptation to the imperatives of transnational capital flows even in remote rural settings is 
evidence of the financialised governmentality radiating outward from the expanding financial 
nexus, gradually interweaving with the fabric of local social relations. Successful 
microfinance demands nothing less than a behavioural (re-)orientation of all the agents 
involved towards ensuring regularity in capital accumulation; the pressure for which feeds 
down through the system, as disciplinary power exerted over actors further down. Although 
not all components of microfinance itself are equally financialised yet - many loans still 
originate from NGO actors unconnected to financial markets - gradually most parts of the 
microfinance system are coming to reflect the commercial template, through which MFIs’ 
activities have become more deeply integrated with transnational financial flows from (and 
back to) mainstream capital markets, and financial motives and calculatory practices have 
come to dominate lending (Aitken 2010). Since the 1990s a new quality of accountability to 
the financial market nexus (rather than states or donors) has infused the microfinance system, 
and has progressively radiated further outward, from MFIs into client livelihoods and into 
donor practices. The increasingly sophisticated financial structures of “middlemen”, informal 
credit bundling, and on-lending among clients highlight the pervasive effects of 
financialisation down to the grassroots level, for a microloan on-lent instead of used 
personally becomes a financial instrument in the hands of the borrower, reflecting a distinctly 
financialised agency. At the other end of the credit chain, even many non-profit donors (not 
investors) are concerned with maximising the return on equity earned with their money, since 
they are convinced that successful “financial inclusion” requires microfinance to be 
“sustainable” – profitable, that is. 
Disciplining and punishing 
We may finally reconstruct the archetypical cascade of governmentality generated in the 
microfinance system, naming the key observation and disciplining devices at each level of 
action (compare Figure 7). To begin with the expectation of (or demand for) regular financial 
flows prevalent at the investor level: pressure emanates “downward” from the financial 
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markets where investors operate, for instance with a Deutsche Bank investment fund buying 
shares in an MFI, or a US pension company purchasing portfolios of collateralised microloans 
from Citigroup. Even socially-motivated investors and governments often invest in 
microfinance through such specialised microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) which 
bundle capital and enforce reliable payments from MFIs. A further large share of capital 
comes from larger domestic banks, who seek a commercial rate of return on their loans. All 
investors, regardless of their colour, require some level of regular and adequate cash flows 
from their investment, and will reallocate their capital should a particular investment 
disappoint. Consequently they monitor balances, consume rating reports, follow asset prices 
and compare MFIs’ performance against benchmarks; the more sophisticated and more 
return-oriented investors, naturally, with greater ardour. 
 
 
Figure 7. Archetypical cascade of governmentality in microfinance 
 
 
Investors’ expectations are, in turn, instilled at the MFI level through standardised 
accounting schemes and regularised reporting requirements. MFI operations are structured 
and monitored by up-to-date MIS which inform head offices quickly (often even same-day) if 
borrowers’ repayment rates somewhere begin to deteriorate, allowing management to 
intervene. Loans are usually repaid weekly, which in itself is an important monitoring device, 
allowing a closer observation of the performance of individual branch offices and loan 
officers. Loan officers receive a large share (sometimes even the bulk) of their salary as 
variable “performance-based” bonuses dependent on their individual success at enforcing on-
time repayment (McKim/Hughart 2005); in the worst case, unsuccessful loan officers 
naturally may be fired or demoted. Branch offices meanwhile are often pitted in competitions 
against each other, such that staff remuneration can depend on branch performance, and 
lenient loan officers feel pressure from stricter (or more financially motivated) colleagues. 
The most famous device in microfinance is the so-called “social collateral” of the 
group lending model, which at the MFI-borrower level interface employs neighbours and 
acquaintances to perform acts of observation and discipline for the MFI, often building on and 
employing existing social hierarchies (cf. Wright 2006).  13   Group leaders perform basic 
accounting for their group and are often required to show the books to the loan officer. In the 
event of one borrower being late with repayment, loan officers usually deploy sanctions 
against their entire group, for instance detaining all members until dues have been paid 
(Rahman 1999: 72f.) – with far-reaching consequences, such as depriving up to forty families 
of a day’s wages – or withholding future credit. Unsurprisingly, group members (neighbours, 
relations, business associates) observe each other intensely in daily life. It is often the 
members of these so called “solidarity groups” who harass other borrowers, shame or threaten 
them in public, and perform the notorious acts of “house-breaking” (ghar banga in Bengali) 
as punishment (Karim 2008: 19); and even worse acts, such as kidnapping children (The 
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Times of India 2010a). But such methods notwithstanding, the everyday means at the 
borrower level are as banal as they are consequential. Loan agents and group members 
sanction borrowers with shame, dishonour, disrepute and bad-mouthing. Particularly in 
Bangladesh, the world’s most microfinance-saturated country, Karim (2011: 84, xviii) says 
NGO-MFIs build a veritable “economy of shame” to generate a “culturally specific 
governmentality” to enforce repayment. Fundamentally, at the grassroots, most microcredit is 
predicated on the threat of punishment via confiscation of the social capital of the poor, 
which is the only type of capital many have ever held. The fact that this social capital cannot 
be monetised by the bank hardly diminishes the punitive effect of its confiscation: the 
effective repossession of a poor person’s social relations can be an existential threat – further 
amplified by shame – as those social ties which normally grant support in hard times are lost 
over unpaid debts, or when neighbours and relatives unite in shunning a distressed debtor. 
Despite the explicitness of many links in this chain of disciplining devices, the type of 
power involved here is best understood as governmentality working through “technologies of 
the self” employed by “disciplinary individuals”, for at each stage, if active techniques of 
power like punishments or sanctions have to be used, it is only because the individuals 
involved have failed to discipline themselves enough. The business - or business-as-usual - of 
microfinance is built on self-discipline: the best way to avoid “house breaking” and 
harassment is always repay on time, even if this necessitates borrowing from a moneylender, 
or becoming a moneylender oneself, adjusting the rhythm of one’s life or family nutrition, and 
otherwise skilfully “juggling with money” (Wampfler et al. 2014) while often struggling to 
meet an unforgiving repayment schedule. In turn, loan officers cannot be lax, or not visit a 
village on schedule, or even restrict their lending to a prudent level, without feeling financial 
and social consequences themselves. Branch office heads must monitor their branch’s 
performance closely, and so on. It is the deployment of this financialised governmentality 
which allows MFIs ultimately to obtain their famed repayment rates. The successful MFI 
works not by regularly “disciplining” and “punishing” borrowers, but by regularly not having 
to do so. 
The grassroots-level effects are tangible. To recall the Hyderabad RCT impact study 
described in Chapter 1, which found a reduction in the consumption of “temptation goods” 
like street food and tea in areas where new MFI branches were opened: this study, we may 
note, inadvertently exposed and documented the power of the financialised governmentality 
explained above. The study authors interpreted the observable reductions in expenditures as 
signs of the success of microfinance at creating more entrepreneurial attitudes: “access to MFI 
credit can act as a disciplining device to help households reduce spending that they would like 
to reduce, but find difficult to reduce in practice” (Banerjee et al. 2009: 28, emphasis added). 
It is worth remembering that the households studied were all “quite poor in absolute terms: 
average nondurable consumption of old business owners and high-propensity households, the 
better-off groups, is less than $5 per person per day at PPP exchange rates: hardly prosperous” 
(Banerjee et al. 2009: 25). By whatever mechanism – whether “allowing” them to reduce 
“spending that they would like to reduce”, as the MIT economists would have it, or rather 
forcing them –, the deployment of transnational financial flows into this poverty environment 
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generated an empirically measurable and statistically significant disciplining effect, getting 
the already-poor to tighten their belts just a little more to meet the expectations of financial 
capital. 
The material of financialisation 
A more subtle and durable means of exploitation? 
The two previous sections have focused on the realms of narrative, culture, ideas, identities, 
and power. But beyond the levels of rights and roles (Simmel) or questions and discourses 
(Yapa), which are crucial, it is important to also consider poverty’s constitution as a material 
relation. This section takes stock of the discernible material “economic” effects, noting how 
microfinance serves to financialise the material relations between rich and poor, re-shaping 
relations of poverty with finance. 
The financialisation literature points to the prospect of debt fulfilling an increasingly 
crucial function in capitalism, holding labour compensation low while simultaneously 
upholding demand and keeping labour under social control. The consequence, as Servet and 
Saiag (2014: 38) explain: “The draining of financial resources through various forms of debt 
can be interpreted as a particular form of the capital-labour relationship […] paying interest to 
develop productive or trading activities is the equivalent of paying a levy on the income from 
this activity.” The mechanism for this “draining” is the profitability of debt, which – once 
attained – facilitates surplus extraction through credit relations. The lack of sufficient capital 
for satisfying its needs among one class, poor people, becomes the basis for a contract with 
members of another class willing (for whatever reasons, whether “social” or “financial”) to 
rent out capital. The former must engage its productive capacities in one way or another to 
repay loans and transfer some fruits of labour to the latter, effectively as rent. One prominent 
former microfinance practitioner  14   has asked: “Is this sort of exploitation what 
microfinance achieves?” He has also offered a “tentative neo-Marxist diagnosis”: 
Microfinance offers a more subtle and potentially more durable means whereby 
those who control capital can exploit those who have only their labor to sell. It does 
not finance machines that require many workers to come together to operate them, 
and possibly to unite against their employer. Microfinanciers can now provide 
capital, in the form of microcredit, which borrowers use to purchase the tiny amounts 
of stocks or simple tools they need to run microenterprises. The surplus they can earn 
is barely sufficient for survival, but because the investments are so small the turnover 
is relatively high and the borrowers can afford to pay high rates of interest on their 
loans. Capitalists no longer have to organize and manage labor. They can extract a 
higher return on their capital not by directly employing people, but by financing their 
petty businesses under the guise of assisting them to become entrepreneurs. Better 
Philip Mader: The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty. 2015. Chapter 3. 
22 
 
still, these entrepreneurs compete against one another rather than combining against 
capital. (Harper 2011: 59) 
Although Harper’s statement comes in the context of the Compartamos IPO (see 
Chapter 2), the quoted section explicitly deals with microfinance as a whole. Coming from an 
erstwhile pioneer, the idea that microfinance as a system could serve to exploit the poor, more 
cunningly and effectively than sweatshops, must be taken as a serious warning. 
Harper’s and Servet/Saiag’s statements point towards the literature in industrial 
sociology dealing with the increasing flexibilisation and individualisation of labour. These 
developments have gone hand-in-hand with a marked decline in the hitherto-normal 
employer-employee relationship premised on fixed wages determined in processes of 
collective bargaining (cf. Braverman 2003). In highly-developed capitalist economies, Voß 
and Pongratz (1998) note the emergence of the Arbeitskraftunternehmer – translated as 
“entreployee”, literally meaning “labour power entrepreneur” – as a growing part of the 
workforce. The “self-entrepreneurial” vendor of labour power archetypically is characterised 
by “self-control”, “self-commercialisation” and “self-rationalisation”, seeking constantly to 
enhance and commodify her own capabilities and potentials more effectively, while 
threatened with harsh economic and social consequences in the event of failure. 
Pongratz and Voß (2003) note how, despite their precarity,  the idealised successful 
white-collar entreployee serves as a normative model in political and societal discourses, 
embodying the ideal of individual success through creativity and perseverance – much like the 
idealised microentrepreneur. Just as the “entreployee” does, the microfinance borrower must 
strive to sell her labour power in a self-administering manner, using the loan as an opportunity 
to enhance and further commodify her capabilities and potentials effectively; hence also the 
recurrent themes of hard work and creativity in the client stories. 
But one may wonder: would such a system for labour power extraction be better than 
employing the poor? After all, it forgoes the productive economies of scale possible through 
regular employment contracts under Taylorist settings. Three powerful advantages for 
capitalists from the entreployee/microfinance-type capital-labour relationship are notable: 
 First, it necessitates no entrepreneurship on the capitalist’s side, generating income 
streams without necessitating actual entrepreneurial activity by the capital-owner. It 
facilitates the rentier type of accumulation by outsourcing the effort of 
entrepreneurship to microfinance borrowers, who self-select the most viable routes for 
surplus-creation available to them. The relationship can achieve considerable scale 
thanks to the work of financial intermediaries like MFIs – in 2009, for instance, each 
SKS Microfinance loan officer in India supervised 488 borrowers. 
 Second, many fixed costs are avoided. Microloans are small, their terms are usually 
one year maximum. Labour power can be acquired on an individual, piece-by-piece 
basis, instead of equipping large-scale facilities (like factories) with fixed quanta of 
manpower. 
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 Third, the risks of entrepreneurship are outsourced to others. A borrower must 
(normally) repay the loan regardless of whether its usage generated a 200 percent 
return or a total loss. Entrepreneurial risk is generally held distant from the capital-
providers, thanks to the self-discipline of the borrowers; with the exception only of 
systemic collapses, as in parts of India in 2010. 
Microfinance thus makes entreployee-type capital-labour relationships possible even with the 
denizens of slums and villages in the Global South – a truly astonishing innovation. This form 
of surplus extraction is plainly more congruent with financialised capitalism than traditional 
employment, and may be understood as part of a fundamental ongoing transformation in how 
labour power is made amenable for capital accumulation in many different spaces.  15   Even 
more, the practical difficulties which self-entrepreneurial individuals face at “combining 
against capital” (Harper 2011) may be seen as an added benefit of the credit-based variant of 
the entreployee, since microborrowers have only a contractual lender, no employer, to appeal 
to or “combine” against. 
Intermediation - borrowing and repaying labour 
To briefly examine the “nuts and bolts” of surplus extraction via credit: the microfinance 
intervention works to intermediate both temporally and socially, by transferring money over 
time, between borrowers’ needs now and their labour later, and social space, between capital-
providers and borrowers. Money, to recall, is not only a means of exchange, but in many ways 
a form of credit, an entitlement, whereby society owes a debt towards the money-holder. 
Primarily a unit of account (of social power), and only secondarily a means of exchange Marx 
(1973 [1858]: 193ff.), in market societies money acts as “a generalized, legitimate claim on 
value” (Carruthers/Ariovich 2010: 6). That having money, in this sense, means power hardly 
is a novel insight, just a basic truth of living under capitalism which Marx, Smith and Simmel 
all recorded in respective ways. But by acting as incentive and coercion at once, since money 
is the “absolute means” (Simmel 2004), the need (and undeniably also desire) to have money 
influentially affects which activities people exert themselves in. As Deutschmann (2008b: 46) 
reminds us: “The freedom which money imparts on the individual spans all dimensions of 
human existence: the social as well as the material, temporal and spatial. […] The only 
trouble with money is: one needs to have it.” 
In a money economy, people must have money. But they do not necessarily need to 
own it to be able to engage in exchange; at the very least they must control some money to 
claim their needs of nourishment and social reproduction. People with no current control over 
money essentially are presented with two legal, market-based ways  16   to acquire claims 
against society: selling their labour power now for money; or borrowing money to repay later, 
with labour power. Both means involve “technologies of the self” in the sense of binding 
oneself. However, “classically” selling labour power binds the worker only for the time she 
makes herself available, while credit (debt) is an obligation to sell one’s labour power in the 
future to pay an earlier-agreed price. Borrowing may placate by opening options to fulfil 
needs in the present, but as an exchange drawn into the future it presses to act later. The credit 
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relationship adds obligation and discipline to what, with money, is merely a variously weaker 
or stronger incentive to perform labour. 
Following Kellermann (2006) and Paul (2006), debt should therefore be understood as 
intensified and abstracted Handlungsorientierung (action orientation), an instruction to act.  17   
Intensified – because a person exchanging something for money is rarely legally obliged to 
exchange (or even obliged to accept money as payment), though she may of course for all 
practical purposes be forced by the circumstances; while a debtor is legally and socially 
obliged to “honour” contractually-agreed debts. Abstracted – because the debtor, unlike the 
wage labourer, (usually) decides for herself what work to do. 
A key difference, then, between the credit-financed entreployee relationship and 
traditional labour relationships lies in the temporal intermediation. While the sale of wage 
labour takes place (effectively) as simultaneous exchange, whereby labour is provided and 
simultaneously remunerated, the debt relationship charges future labour against the temporary 
present usage of claims. A contract of sale as an exchange of commodities, or of things acting 
as commodities, – for instance a shoe, or the labour power used to produce it – for money is 
completed upon transferral. Whereas a contract of debt endures over time; there is no direct 
exchange of commodities, but of money for money-plus-money: the sale of (now)money^1 
against (later)money^interest. In a credit relation, the objects of exchange are past labour 
power (claims already held by the lender) for future labour power (future claims granted by 
the borrower), and the interest is surplus labour paid to the lender.  18   To fulfil the contract, 
the debtor generally needs to perform labour, or in exceptional cases at least contract with 
others do so (for instance by becoming their moneylender). 
The post-Victorian moralisers of credit in the early 20th century, whom Calder (1999: 
252) studied, clearly recognised the obligation and discipline which today’s microfinance 
sector obscures under layers of empowerment rhetoric: “Give a man a home mortgage, it was 
held, and he will work twice as hard”. While an employer must engage in (often costly) 
measures to ensure employees exert their labour power effectively, a creditor transfers the 
onus to deliver labour power to the debtor. Uncertainties about a specific borrower’s future 
capacity to deliver; the lender’s capacity to enforce repayment; and the urgency of the 
borrower’s need for money are all priced as interest.  19  
Why then do people enter into debt? To subject oneself to future discipline for a 
temporary increase in freedom seems by no means an evident course of action – so why do it? 
Most credit theorists (including Marxians like Lapavitsas, 2003) focus on the opposite end, 
asking how it is that creditors can gain sufficient confidence. Such analyses are hardly fair to 
the debtor. The proximate reasons for entering into a microcredit relationship must clearly be 
as diverse as the people involved, who have all sorts of needs which they must (or wish to) 
fulfil in the present. However, there are important overall structural causes, which Barbara 
Ehrenreich’s ironically-formulated “alternative theory” of poverty as a shortage of money 
succinctly sums up.  20   People who lack money will pay much for money. In extremis: offer 
a starving person a dollar at any interest rate, and they must take it (or die); with survival 
threatened today, one must deal with the consequences tomorrow. Offering a poor but not 
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starving person a sizeable quantum of credit, it should be unsurprising if abstract notions of 
prudent financial management over the next year(s) figure insignificantly in their 
considerations compared to the real food put on the family’s plates today, the value of paying 
that urgent medical bill, etc.  21  
A brief look at their relationship with the often-ostracised traditional moneylender in 
India also illuminates the element of “choice” most poor people have taking on debt. Amit 
Bhaduri (1989: 245) writes: 
his helplessness as a borrower is more acute, the more desperately he needs the loan 
(e.g. consumption loan for survival). Analytically, the more inelastic is the 
borrower’s demand function for loan, the more vulnerable he would be to this 
method of usury [purposefully induced default for capital gains by the lender] 
described earlier. As a matter of fact, his only defence in the extreme case of totally 
inelastic demand for loan may simply lie in deliberately defaulting, if the interest rate 
is raised too high by the lender. In that case, he accepts losing his collateral asset 
instead of trying to meet the high interest charge.  22  
When daily life is an uncertain struggle to make ends meet, the needs of the present 
must loom so large that the trials of the future will appear distant. Via credit, a short-term 
uncertainty (for instance, how to feed the family) is traded for a long-term uncertainty (how to 
repay). This proposition becomes all the more sensible the more uncertain the long term itself 
is likely to be. 
None of this suggests irrationality on the borrower’s behalf, or a conscious rational 
decision to use credit for what microfinance economists sanguinely label “consumption 
smoothing”.  23   It is simply to note that under duress – and poverty brings duress – any 
temporary respite from uncertainty and hardship, even a loan which brings punitive longer-
term consequences, will be welcome. Adding to this the borrowers’ comprehensible 
aspirations for social rise, their multiple social pressures, and the rampant disinformation 
about loan conditions in the microfinance industry (cf. Stoll 2012; Salazar 2014; Hummel 
2014): the potential toxicity of microfinance’s tryst of ample credit supply with ample poor 
populations becomes evident. 
This analysis should not be taken to imply that borrowers naively or wholly 
involuntarily enter into microfinance. As Dichter (2007: 9–10) has made the argument: 
if microcredit providers have been myopic about debt, the poor of the developing 
world have not. They get it. Borrowing money means being in debt and their 
attitudes about this fact have generally been neglected. Perhaps more important, the 
mechanisms that kept people out of debt in traditional societies – mutual aid, family 
exchanges and other reciprocal forms of economic safety nets – may well be 
threatened by the growing tendency to democratize credit for the poor as a natural 
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‘right’. There is … hidden beneath the surface of microcredit, a dark and slippery 
slope that begins with the simple fact of debt. 
It merely highlights that microfinance borrowers must make choices within narrow 
given opportunity structures. As much as some borrowers may have genuine opportunities, 
and some may have a true preference for risky debt, in many cases it is the sheer need for 
money which will make people’s demand for loaned money so steep as to justify very high 
costs. I wish to make no categorical claim here for why people individually indebt themselves, 
merely to highlight that structural coercion is likely to drive many into debt to an MFI, and 
accept the discipline and obligations. 
Finally, these structural-theoretical arguments should not be taken to suggest the form, 
function and scope of credit relations are immutable over time. On the contrary, as the 
financialisation literature and social-scientific histories of credit and finance demonstrate, the 
shape and function of credit has changed dramatically particularly over the past decades, as 
has its overall magnitude. Microcredit rather is proof that changing social meanings of credit 
serve to transform and expand financial markets. With de Goede (2005: xv): “[m]oney, capital 
and finance are not unmediated economic realities” but are “made possible through contested 
historical articulations and practices of valuation.” Microfinance brings the activities of poor 
people into globalised practices of financial valuation by articulating them as demand for 
credit, in the process challenging not only the traditional moneylender,  24   but also the 
assumption that poor people in the Global South are poor debtors. It renders their needs and 
productive capacities perceptible to the transnational financial market – certainly no small 
feat. 
The innovation of microfinance 
The work done in financial markets is that of continually creating new and mediating existing 
entitlements on the labour of others. In a most rudimentary sense this is done by temporarily 
granting claims against society to those who in return offer claims on their labour later.  25   
This issuing and trading of certificates or coupons for future payment is the act of financial 
intermediation. Creating new types and forms of such entitlements – often based on or 
referential to existing ones, as with derivatives – by which their total magnitude increases, is 
financial innovation. 
Microfinance in this sense performs both financial intermediation and financial 
innovation. As discussed above, it intermediates in creating new entitlement relationships 
reaching from now to the future and from capital providers to borrowers. It innovates in 
generating new financial technologies which bring fresh borrowers into connection with 
capital-providing actors who can pursue not only financial goals, such as rapid turnover and 
growth of capital via above-market interest rates, but also quasi-charitable ideals. The 
microfinance industry has developed (and continues to develop) technical means for 
channelling substantial quanta of capital directly to people without collateral or assets at the 
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bottom of the global income scale, technologies including group lending, social collateral, 
standardisation and computerisation, ratings of MFIs, and securitisation of loan portfolios. 
The growth and stability of global microlending, at between 17 and 78 percent annually 
2002–2009, and 10 percent on average since then (MIX 2013), both demonstrates the 
resulting system’s efficacy and indicates that capital-owners expect it to be durable. 
The innovation of microfinance is particularly notable for the fact that the resulting 
financial relation runs directly from the (very) poor to the (very) wealthy, globally; actors who 
have been only tenuously financially connected in the past, with diverse layers of middlemen 
and organisations separating owners of substantial capital from the pawnshops, moneylenders 
and credit associations of the poor. Thanks to microfinance it is now possible for a Bill Gates 
to literally strike business deals with some of the poorest people on Earth and become entitled 
to asset streams generated by them, necessitating only the intermediation of an MFI.  26   The 
reality of global finance finding value in the world the poor is strikingly reflected, not least, in 
the title of that foremost publication on financial inclusion, Portfolios of the Poor: while the 
authors’ intent was to highlight how poor people manage their money as aptly as professional 
portfolio managers, the title (probably inadvertently) illustrates the material dimension of the 
financialisation of poverty, of microfinance building portfolios of the poor which the wealthy 
can invest in. 
With credit, its predominant activity, microfinance turns those activities via which 
poor people around the world manage their poverty day-by-day into assets for investors to 
accumulate on their portfolios. The relationship of poverty is reconstituted financially, as 
return-seeking capital flows from holders of financial wealth, through intermediaries (MFIs), 
to borrowers with needs or desires that apparently cannot be fulfilled otherwise than through 
debt. This capital is repaid, through the intermediaries, back to the owners, together with 
surplus payments in the shape of interest or dividends for the capital-providers, and fees, 
salaries, bonuses, etc., for the intermediaries. Sophisticated financial instruments such as 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) are mere variations – steering, manipulating and 
increasing the scope and trajectories of the financial in- and outflows – on the principle. What 
makes microfinance microfinance is not that small sums of money are handled in basic 
transactions, but that these transactions are part of a system of finance recognisable to other 
systems of finance. Microfinance is not the same as moneylending or pawnbrokering; it is 
financially more advanced, incorporating the calculatory devices, languages and logics of 
mainstream finance into the activity of lending to poor people. 
A 2004 example of a microfinance Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) proudly 
presented by the International Finance Corporation (a publicly-funded body, part of the World 
Bank Group) illustrates the depth of the financialised logic operating in the microfinance 
system: 
IFC-guaranteed bonds allowed Compartamos to raise peso-denominated long-term 
funds from the local capital market. IFC’s involvement enhanced the credit risk 
rating of the bonds from A to AA (local scale), allowing institutional investors to 
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acquire the securities … Compartamos is now a publicly traded commercial bank 
with 700,000 clients in the poorest rural and semi-rural regions of Mexico. 
(Shanahan 2007) 
Thanks to the IFC, Compartamos Banco – at the time still considerably smaller than when it 
raised $473.9 million through an IPO in 2007 – obtained $16.6 million from pension funds. 
Citigroup did the brokerage. The deal was hailed as a successful step in making microfinance 
more accessible to major financial players because 
The structure let Compartamos, which has a local A+ rating, to raise [sic] the 
transaction’s rating to AA. This is important in Mexico, where managed pension 
funds, or Afores, with $63 billion in assets, are now the major source of domestic 
capital. By law, they can allocate only 5% of their portfolio to A-rated private-sector 
domestic debt. […] “Market reaction was exceptional,” says Lee Meddin, deputy 
treasurer and global head of structured finance at the IFC. (IFC 2005) 
The steps of logic behind this intervention in the credit relation are worth comprehending; 
Figure 8 illustrates. By guaranteeing payments to investors (1), which improved the bond 
rating (2), the IFC lowered the risk and increased the expected returns for those willing to 
finance Compartamos (3, 4). This interpretation of the IFC’s mission of strengthening the 
microfinance sector  27   is reasonable, given the assumption that making capital for MFIs 
cheaper generates cost structure improvements which are passed on to borrowers (5) in the 
form of lower interest rates or expanded lending, which the borrowers desire (6). 
 
 
Figure 8. IFC’s role in Compartamos’ CDO 
 
 
However, notably, interventions like that of the IFC leave the risk for any individual 
borrower of defaulting or failing completely unchanged. Certainly, the amplified supply of 
investment capital might make clients’ future borrowing easier by lowering interest rates 
and/or increasing the overall amount of funds available, thereby indirectly raising the 
expectable financial success of borrowers’ activities and increasing their economic welfare; in 
theory - but Compartamos has remained internationally notorious for its interest rates of up to 
195 APR (Roodman 2011). What happened in the case described here was that the 
intervention made the chain of payments and repayments risk-free for investors without 
addressing the risk to the client, the supposed beneficiary. Intriguingly, the IFC’s “pro poor 
orientation” (Shanahan 2007) was not pursued by, for instance, subsidising interest payments 
for struggling clients, or providing clients with training for business success - both of which 
should benefit the MFI as well. Instead, the IFC used public funds to the approach the 
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perceived problem of a lack of credit amongst poor people, which in itself is already a 
thoroughly financialised conception of poverty, in a doubly-financialised way: by giving aid 
to those who finance the lenders of the poor. In a supply-side logic taken to the extreme, for 
the IFC poverty is evidently a problem of the financial system, so the solution is to support 
the financial system. The metric of success of its intervention (and on which the IFC achieved 
success), logically, was the accessibility and attractiveness of microfinance as an object of 
financial investment. 
While the financial system of microfinance is still importantly buttressed by such 
interventions, as a proportion of total funding direct and indirect subsidies are declining. 
Microfinance more and more consists in the material relation between owners of capital and 
poor borrowers. As Brigg (2001: 251) presciently noted, the logical consequence of the 
intermarriage of microcredit with mainstream financial markets is that the costs of lending 
“must ultimately be extracted from the final borrowers in microcredit programs”. 
If the credit relation built by microfinance is to be the basis for a truly feasible 
investment, microfinance must generate sufficient payments, and remain in existence even 
after successive loan cycles have been concluded. The demand among poor people for high-
interest low-volume loans must continue. It is nearly a truism that, were this demand to 
diminish over time, even such interventions as the IFC’s bond guarantees could not maintain 
the viability of MFI investments. This elementary insight has potentially far-reaching 
consequences, above all in rendering doubtful the commensurability of the goal of poverty 
eradication with microfinance’s commercial orientation. Microfinance theory holds that 
MFIs’ assurance of being around to offer future loans is essential since - in the absence of 
collateral - it is the promise of future loans which ensures clients’ repayments (Bond/Rai 
2009; Morduch 2013).  28   Would borrowers assume that an MFI will disappear soon, their 
incentives to repay would be diminished. One key rationale for commercialisation, says 
CGAP (2004), is the promise of permanence which it brings, since “unsustainable” non-profit 
operations will ultimately run out of funds, but commercial ones are there to stay, and the 
clients know this. 
What if MFIs were one day able to proclaim: “mission accomplished, poverty 
eradicated”, or for any other reasons cease to issue loans - would their outstanding loans be 
repaid? It is doubtful that (in this very hypothetical scenario) the end of poverty, or the end of 
microfinance, would be “financially sustainable”. In this very simple sense, commercial 
microfinance depends on a certain re-production of poverty in each loan cycle. I make no 
argument that this is deliberate, or even that microlending is culpable. Merely to clarify: if it 
were the case that microenterprises regularly “graduated” to levels where the formal banking 
sector were willing to serve them at regular conditions, or if microborrower households could 
begin to make ends meet without needing debt, they would likely not wish to continue paying 
high interest rates for short term loans. Given the state of quantitative impact assessments, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, it appears neither as if clients were systematically “graduating” out of 
microfinance, nor coming back voluntarily for more because they fared so well, but rather that 
their situation is unchanged after each consecutive round of borrowing and repaying; and the 
microfinance industry feeds on this. 
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Quantifying surplus extraction 
Through microfinance, one person’s poverty can become the basis for surplus accumulation 
by another.  29   That phenomenon is, of course, as old as capitalism itself; but microfinance-
built credit relations represent an innovative form which brings even informal and subsistence 
economic activities, of the kind with which many poor people in the Global South are 
presently engaged in to manage their poverty, into the reach of mainstream capital. It expands 
the frontier of finance to make these activities amenable for capital accumulation. But is the 
surplus extraction attained through this considerable, or relevant? Not everything must be 
quantified, and this research has deliberately chosen a qualitative analysis over a quantitative 
approach. Yet – having established the principle at work – a brief quantitative assessment will 
establish the scope of the phenomenon. 
As a collector and disseminator of investor-oriented information about microfinance, 
the “Microfinance Information Exchange” MIX collates various indicators of MFIs’ financial 
performance, including their loan balances and returns, and captures the bulk of global 
microlending. Despite some qualitative issues (see Appendix), the MIX offers the best 
publicly available global large data set on the finances of the microfinance industry. For 2012 
(the latest year with reliable data) 1,257 MFIs reported the size of loans outstanding (total 
$100.7 billion) to the MIX, out of which 885 also reported their “Yield on Gross Loan 
Portfolio”.  30   Yield (a percentage figure) is a routinely used proxy for effective interest 
rates, similar to a gross margin: it is the total income earned over a period divided by the 
average outstanding portfolio over that period. 
To determine the amount of surplus value extracted by MFIs in 2012, I calculated the 
actual loan earnings of each MFI using this data (see Figure 9). Factoring each MFI’s loans 
by its yield, a total of $17.319 billion is found to have been extracted. The mean yield of the 
MFIs which reported their yield, weighted by loan portfolio size, was 21.54 percent; assuming 
the yield of those MFIs which did not report their yield to be the same,  31   we arrive at a 
global total of $21.696 billion as an estimate of what borrowers actually paid to the 
microfinance industry in 2012. (See Appendix for detailed calculation methods.) What does 
this figure mean? 
 It is not the profit earned by MFIs, or their investors; MFIs face high costs, including 
personnel, infrastructure, loan loss provisions and the cost of capital, which might 
ultimately make the returns for many negative; although we know from well-
publicised cases around the globe that microfinance can be very gainful for owners 
and managers. We know that the bulk of microfinance, even the formally “non-profit”, 
has been profitable for years (Rosenberg 2008). 
 This figure, also, does not automatically represent a loss for the poor, since the best net 
estimate of the effect of microloans, after deducting all costs, is currently zero. 
The figure simply tells us how much surplus was extracted by the microfinance industry from 
its borrowers in 2012; surplus which, we know, must be produced through some form of 
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labour. It details the price which borrowers paid for their “financial inclusion” via microcredit 
in 2012 in terms of the market value of the labour expended. 
 
 
Figure 9. Surplus extraction through microfinance, 1995–2012 
 
 
Roughly $21.7 billion then was the value of the labour performed by microfinance 
borrowers for the microfinance industry and its principals in 2012. What could one compare 
this to? For scale: the government of Greece paid €13.017 billion ($16.582 billion) in debt 
service in 2010, for a total debt of €329.3 billion ($419.5 billion) at the time.  32   As a 
sovereign, despite with hindsight being the less reliable debtor, Greece paid a lower interest 
rate than microborrowers, whose total microfinance debt 2012 was “only” $100.7 billion. 
This comparison illustrates how lucrative microfinance lending can be, compared with some 
other options capitalists have. We may also compare microfinance surplus extraction to the 
debt relief granted in 2005, the year of the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, which was $24.357 
billion.  33   Microfinance recoups almost this sum every year. The rise of microdebt, in 
parallel with public austerity, may be seen as a reflection in the political economy of 
development of the supplanting of public debt with private debt (cf. Streeck 2011). Evidently, 
microborrowers’ aggregate debt service is today at least as “systemically relevant” as 
Greece’s, and threatens to (privately) undo much the (public) debt relief obtained by 
developing countries a few years ago. 
But $21.7 billion was only 2012. MIX data for MFIs’ gross loan portfolios reaches 
back to 1995, and yield data to 2003 (see Figure 9). Calculating only the surpluses known to 
have been extracted from 2003 to 2012 gives a total of $88.792 billion. Extrapolating for 
those MFIs which did not report yield (as done above) and backwards for all until 1995, the 
figure rises to $124.579 billion, as the estimated total value extracted so far via microfinance. 
For a number of reasons, including portfolio growth, under-reporting, conservative 
assumptions, and data delays (see Appendix), these figures are likely to very grossly 
underestimate the actual surplus extracted. But $125 billion at least offers a minimum 
estimate of how much value has already gone into the financial system from microfinance 
borrowers, as a quantitative indication of the sheer scope of accumulation through finance 
thanks to this financialisation of poverty. 
Conclusion 
The overarching question of this book is “What does microfinance work at – and how?”. This 
chapter clarifies that it works at financialising poverty. That is certainly not the worst thing 
ever to have happened to poor people in the Global South. Financialised capitalism and its 
development tool of choice, microfinance, might well imply more humane forms of social 
Philip Mader: The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty. 2015. Chapter 3. 
32 
 
control and surplus extraction than past variants of capitalism and previous modes of 
production. Squaring the estimates of zero poverty impact with the surplus extraction 
documented here, one may conclude that the results are Pareto-efficient, in that some are 
made better-off while others’ situation remains unchanged. The rub, however, is that by all 
available evidence it is not the poor being made better-off, and rather the financial 
intermediaries and the capital-providers. 
This chapter has engaged microfinance as an important site of financialisation, where 
a system of credit relations is constructed via positive mobilising narratives, which produces 
financialised governmentality and financialised material relations. Microfinance promises 
empowerment thanks to finance, presenting poverty as a problem of finance, such that loans 
even appear superior to charity or redistribution. The “political” effects of microfinance 
include strengthening the policies of liberalisation, but the system also has more fundamental 
political effects, in that it deploys technologies to create chains of observation and discipline 
which emanate down from mainstream financial circuits into the daily lives of borrowers - 
financialised governmentality. Through this, the material relations between rich and poor are 
financialised – re-shaped with finance – as poor people enter into the valuation practices of 
global capital accumulation circuits as self-administering labour. The result is a substantial 
and growing extraction of surplus labour into the financial system, amounting to nearly $21.7 
billion in 2012, and $125 billion since 1995. 
As matter-of-fact as the latter calculation may appear, it evinces a powerful 
development in capitalism which renders the labour of many millions of people – perhaps 
even for the first time – accessible and relevant to capital accumulation. Microfinance may 
only be the beginning of an even more finance-driven form of accumulation which builds new 
financial enclosures on the present frontier of finance by enclosing such resources as the 
social capital of the poor – and, as the next chapter discusses, public goods such as water. 
“Financial inclusion”, as the presently proclaimed aim of microfinance, acquires a new 
meaning in this reading: “including” poor people in the financial market serves to bring their 
poverty inside the frontier of finance as an investable asset for the rich. By constructing a 
system of finance replete with the calculative metrics of mainstream finance, microfinance 
makes the activities of poverty perceptible and accessible, even useful, for the larger financial 
market. On the pristine terrains opened up by microfinance for capital accumulation, the 
labour power of the poor can be harnessed and employed where it stands - instead of uprooted 
and transported, as with industrial labour - when it becomes govern-able and value-able via 
finance. 
Microfinance – to return to Yapa and Simmel – turns the relation of poverty into a 
financial relation, in the discursive sense of being understood as a problem of finance, and the 
material-political sense of a new institution to manage and control the poor. These arguments 
and findings echo Klas’ (2011) depiction of microfinance as “the business of poverty” (Das 
Geschäft mit der Armut). Certainly, finding that the poverty of one person is profitable for 
another, under capitalism, is hardly novel. But what microfinance does is to make some 
poverty more profitable more easily, by making it a problem of finance. Moreover, given our 
financialised culture, in which finance is often seen as innately empowering, microfinance 
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makes poverty profitable more easily by squaring profits with idealistic visions of helping 
others. It is, truly, financialised capitalism’s logical response to poverty. 
Muhammad Yunus (2003: 150) says that “credit creates economic power, which 
quickly translates into social power”, and we agree on this. But the preceding pages show why 
we disagree on the question of who gains these powers, and what direction they take. Debtors 
must discipline themselves in order to pay creditors with their surplus labour power. Their 
debt contract is often only formally a free choice. Putting together the narrative-based 
aspirations with the governmental, material realities reveals microfinance as a fundamentally 
contradictory phenomenon. It creates a materially adversarial relationship between lender and 
borrower precisely where the harmony of labour and capital is promised. In short: 
financialised poverty-eradication does not seem possible or plausible. If masses of poor 
people were actually empowered to no longer require high-interest loans to attain their goals – 
of survival, or of modest economic and social progress – they would hardly continue paying 
microfinance lenders substantial quanta of their surplus labour. The best which microfinance 
can achieve is to financialise poverty itself, making it sustainably utilisable as the basis for 
financial asset creation.  34  
A note on intent, to conclude: having shown microfinance to be financialising poverty, 
how much culpability or intent does this imply? To be candid: microfinance is not a 
conspiracy to exploit, but a contradictory effort built on a contemporarily still widespread 
faith in the power of finance to resolve social problems, which has coincided with a 
favourable political landscape and private benefits. I do not believe cynicism or intent to 
exploit poor people to be driving the actors who support microfinance. Rather, following 
Keynes (1973: 383), “the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas”. As I have shown above, positive and even progressive ideas 
have mattered greatly. Furthermore, as Rajan (2010: 39) clarifies with regards to the subprime 
credit expansion in the USA: “Whether the action was driven by conscious intent or 
unintentional guidance is immaterial to its broader consequences.” I would suggest, as the best 
possible explanation, that microfinance was politically opportune, as a most viable and 
congruent programme under the present circumstances of financialisation, compared with the 
universe of alternatives. 
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Figure 7. Archetypical cascade of governmentality in microfinance 
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Figure 8. IFC’s role in Compartamos’ CDO 
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Figure 9. Surplus extraction through microfinance, 1995–2012 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
1. Husbands often appropriate the loans (Rahman 1999). Even where they do not, the outcome generally depends 
on women adopting traditionally “masculine” and “rational” roles – following de Goede – in employing and 
taming finance as a tool for market exchange (a “male” domain in many societies) while simultaneously 
retaining responsibility for the traditionally “feminine” duties of social reproduction (Karim 2011).  
2. In 2012 it declined to $ 60.2 million (7th place).  
3. The coercion implied in their book title evidently never occurred to the authors.  
4. Figures presented by US-based lobby group RESULTS for “What Makes Microfinance a Smart Investment?” 
(http://results.techriver.net/website/article.asp?id=253; last accessed 25 October 2014). RESULTS is the 
powerhouse behind the microcredit summit campaign.  
5. A number of funds and MFIs even refer to “triple bottom lines”, with variations on what the third one should be.  
6. Lutter (2010) deals with the lottery market, but his idea may be expanded to any market where money is 
traded for hope under conditions of uncertainty.  
7. An official endorsement even describes Portfolios as the “new bible” for combating global poverty – note 
Simmel’s association of money with religion! 
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8. Weigel (2011) cites Steinbeck as saying: “Socialism never took root in America because the poor see 
themselves not as an exploited proletariat but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires.” The quote is possibly 
apocryphal, but Steinbeck (2003) did write: “I guess the trouble was that we didn’t have any self-admitted 
proletarians. Everyone was a temporarily embarrassed capitalist.”  
9.  Not to suggest complete cynicism on Yunus’ part; Professor Yunus is an outstanding rhetorician with a 
penchant for hyperbole. But the fundamental message is clear: microfinance is the only chance the poor will get, 
so that, vice versa, were one to argue that the poor should not have microcredit, one would deny them 
participation in society, akin to that which outcastes have suffered for centuries.   
10. On the significance of the Panopticon, see Foucault (1975).  
11. Fringe credit refers to loans to poor and marginal customers, traditionally shunned by mainstream financial 
systems. Brooks (2004) includes “pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, check-cashing outlets and other noncharter 
lenders offering such services as payday or title loans and tax refund anticipation loans” among the traditional 
so-called fringe lenders; see also Rivlin (2010). More recently, Soederberg (2014) connects fringe finance to the 
rise of “debtfare states”.  
12. Karim (2011) observed much of the same in Bangladesh.  
13. Group lending is slowly on the decline in microfinance in favour of individual loans; these, however, often 
use co-signers and guarantors, thus following a similar principle.  
14. Malcolm Harper co-founded and managed the erstwhile leading Indian MFI BASIX, which substantially laid 
the groundwork for modern microfinance in India. BASIX entered a protracted process of self-questioning after 
2001, which led it to shift focus from simple microcredit to activities aimed at actively expanding and improving 
clients’ livelihood choices (Harper/Iyer/Rosser 2011).   
15. Take for instance also IBM’s 2012 announcement to reduce staff in Germany by 40 percent and manage 
projects with a shrinking core of employees, with the majority of labour supplied by freelance workers recruited 
from a global “talent cloud”. These would be certified as “blue”, “silver” or “gold” talents and rated individually 
by a mouse-click. The “casual labourer for rent” (“Miet-Jobber”) would offer her services on an “eBay for 
labour” (Spiegel 2012; Dettmer/Dohmen 2012).   
16. This qualifier excludes inheritance, redistribution within the household, robbery, deception, begging, etc.  
17. The action orientation is, of course, embedded within the social norms sanctioning defaulting behaviour. It 
holds within the legal bounds of the right to default or declare bankruptcy, which in most developing countries 
like India is largely structured to be irrelevant for poor people (Solan 2011).   
18. CGAP (2000), interestingly, also notes: “Financial services allow people to reallocate expenditure across 
time […] if you don’t have the ability to pay for things now, out of current income, you can pay for them out of 
past income or future income, or some combination of both”.   
19. Ironically, the past also figures into determining the price through means like credit scoring and risk-based 
pricing; thus, a credit/debt contract actually prices future labour into the present via past labour. For success 
(from the perspective of the creditor) the costs of strategic default must be made prohibitively high. Ideally, only 
at the price of illegality and the loss of all social relations and reputation can a debtor “take the money and run”.  
20. As Ehrenreich quipped in a PBS panel discussion: “A theory for a long time […] is that poverty means 
there’s something wrong with your character, that you’ve got bad habits, you’ve got a bad lifestyle, you’ve made 
the wrong choices. I would like to present an alternative theory, which is that poverty is not a character flaw: 
poverty is a shortage of money.” (Ehrenreich 2012: 1:48)  
21. Consider the statement by an Indian borrower at the top of Chapter 5: “We had always needed money, and 
the supply suddenly seemed unlimited. We stopped saying no.”  
22. Badhuri understands consumption loans as signs of desperation, as opposed to the financial inclusion 
discourse understanding them as empowering choices.  
23.  Portfolios of the Poor being the landmark publication that argues this is why people rationally (should) use 
credit.  
24. These moneylenders were/are largely unconnected to transnational financial flows. Microfinance challenges 
them in theory; in practice their relationship is more complex, sometimes symbiotic (see Chapter 5).  
25. This applies to credit as well as equity finance.  
26. Not to suggest this is a motive behind Gates’ noted support for microfinance, though materially the relationship 
takes this form.  
27. “IFC’s microfinance strategy involves establishing new institutions and strengthening existing ones. It also 
includes transforming nongovernmental organizations into regulated microfinance institutions, encouraging 
commercial banks to engage in microfinance, attracting new capital for microfinance through pooled investment 
vehicles, and promoting the sector as a desirable asset class to investors in capital markets.” (Shanahan 2007)  
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28. As if social pressures played no role! 
29. The creation of surplus value, following Marx (1976) being a “quantitative aspect” of the production process, 
where value is produced beyond the amount necessary to sustain the labourer and the labour process itself.  
30. These 885 accounted for 79.8 percent of the global loan portfolio. Of the $20.3 billion reported without yield, 
$10.9 billion were with Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).  
31. Since the figure is in the same ballpark with Rosenberg, Gonzalez and Narain’s (2009) estimate of interest 
rates of 175 “sustainable” MFIs, 28.2 percent.  
32. 2010 figures are important, because this was the last year that Greek government bonds were not wholly 
“junk” (which raised its interest rates massively), and before “haircuts” reduced its debt load. Number sources: 
debt service, Government of Greece budget for 2011 (Greek Government 2010); gross debt, Eurostat (2012); 
exchange rate €0.785 for $1 (average for 2010).   
33. This debt relief was one-off; in 2012, only $3.01 billion were forgiven (OECD 2014).  
34. Echoing Hartmann’s (2014: 97) analysis of “social business” as investments by multinational corporations in 
“the renewable resource of poverty” (“eine Investition in die nachwachsende Ressource Armut“).  
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